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INCENTIVE 

CONTRACTING 


Tom Mann 

Procurement Analyst 
Pricing Specialist 
SAF/AQCP 



Presentation Defined 


"An overview of various contract tools that can 
be implemented to incentivize our contractors in 
cost, schedule, and performance . Developing 
tools to incentivize all three legs of this stool is 
difficult. This session also includes an 
explanation and discussion of contract geometry 
of incentive arrangements." 

Def: Incentive - [L. incentivus, fr. incinere to 
strike up or set the tune, fr. In-+ canere. to singl 
1. Inciting; stimulative 2. That which incites, or 
tends to incite, to determination or action; 
motive; spur 

STEP 1 - DO YOU BELONG HERE? 



Index 


Types of Incentives 
Multiple Incentives 
Cost Incentive Contracts 

3 Ways to Develop Contract 
Geometry 

Pitfalls Associated with an Incentive 
Contract 

My Lessons Learned 
Cost Incentive Take Aways 



Types of Incentives 

Performance Incentive 

- Product Characteristic 
(Range/Speed/Thrust) 

- Technical Performance (Overall 
performance of end item) 

Delivery Incentive (Improve from 
Required Schedule 
Cost Incentive (Manage Cost) * 
Multiple-Incentive * 

Other 


Multiple Incentives 


What Are They? 

What Are They For? 

How Do They Work? 

Example 

Graphs 

Take Aways 



Multiple Incentives - What Are 

They? 

Incentives Involving Schedule, 
Performance, Cost Control - Three Legs 
of the Stool 
Combination of 

- Motivation (Tech Progress, Timely Deliv, 
Effect Cost Control 

- Ultimate Objective (Balance between 3 Legs) 
Basic Elements - Cost Incentive, 
Increased/Decreased Fee/Profit, 

Balanced Incentive Structure 



Multiple Incentives - What Are 
They For? 

Attain Appropriate Balance 
between the 3 Legs of the Stool 

Quantitatively relate Profit 
Motivation with Government 
Objectives 

Cost Incentive drives Minimum 
Acceptable Performance : Multiple 
Incentive - Maybe/Maybe Not - 
best combination 



Multiple Incentives - How Do 
They Work? 


6 Steps 

- Select Parameters (Cost Must Be One) 

- Establish Optimistic, Pessimistic, Target 
Outcomes for Non-Cost Performance 
Parameters 

* Optimistic - Achievable and Of Value to Gov’t 

* Pessimistic - Acceptable to Gov't 

- Estimate Target Cost and Target Fee/Profit 

- Estimate Optimistic/Pessimistic Cost Outcomes 

- Establish Fee Pool 

- Establish Relative Importance of Incentivized 
Parameters 



Multiple Incentives - Example 


Cost Structure (CPIF) 

- Target Cost = 120 

- Target Fee = 10 

- Max Fee = 18 (10 + 4 + 2 + 2) 

- Minimum Fee = 2 (10 - 4 - 2 - 2) 

- Share 80/20 

- Fee Swing = +-8 

Performance (Payload) 

- Range 40k (MP), 50k (T), 60k (MO) +- $2M 

Delivery 

- Range 40 Mos (MP), 36 Mos (T), 32 Mos (MO) +- 
$2M 



ProtfP/Fe 


Multiple Incentives - Graphing 





6 0 
Delivery (Mos) 


"Goalposting the 
Incentives" 


& Target 


Multiple Incentives - Examples 


• Program 1 CPOIF - Fixed 2%, Event 1 - 2%, Event 
2 - 2%, Initial Performance Eval 3%, Event 4 - 2% 
- 7 pages tables, interim evals, mixes schedule 
with tech perf, cost interims uses CPR data 

• Program 2 - Cost Incentive 6% - Performance 4% 
(all or none), 2% other 

• Program 3 - Fixed 3%, 7% cost/sched/tech 
incentive (all or none) 

• Program 4 - 3% min/5% max cost (70/30), 9% 
delivery key milestones (6 at 1%, 1 at 3%), 6 yr 
failure period 5 critical functions, up to 10% 
repayment 



Multiple Incentives - Take 
Aways 

Know What Behavior You Want 
Know What Behavior You Will Drive 

Analyze Potential Trade-offs - Want 
Balance 

Keep Simple - Assessment Can Be 
Difficult 

Detailed information in DoD/NASA 
Incentive Guide, Army Guide, Navy 
Guide, etc. 



Cost Incentive Contracts 


* Types 

* Uses 

* Descriptions 
9 Elements 

* Central Theme 

* Quick Refresher 




Cost Incentive Contracts 

- Types 

Fixed-Price Incentive (F??) 

Fixed-Price Incentive (Successive Targets) 
Fixed-Price with Award Fee 

- No Objective Measurement 

- Award Fee in Addition to F&R Profit 

- Exceed Satisfactory Performance 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee 

- Base Fee Fixed 

- Motivate Excellence Quality, Timeliness, Technical 
Ingenuity, Cost Effective Mgt 

- No Trade Offs at Expense of Min Reqts 



Cost Incentive Contracts - Uses 


* Purpose: Incentivize Cost Control 

* Result: Influence Behavior 

* Establishes Profit/Fee formula 

9 Share Ratio is always meaningful 

* FPIF and CPIF are "Cost Type" 
Contracts 




Cost Incentive Contracts - 
Descriptions 

Fixed-Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) 

Fixed-Price Incentive - Successive Targets (FPIS) 
Fixed-Price with Award Fee (FPAF) 

- No Objective Measurement 

- Award Fee in Addition to F&R Profit 

- Exceed Satisfactory Performance 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) 

- Base Fee Fixed 

- Motivate Excellence Quality, Timeliness, Technical 
Ingenuity, Cost Effective Mgt 

- No Trade Offs at Expense of Min Reqts 




Cost Incentive Contracts - 
Elements 

Fixed-Price Incentive Firm 

- Target Cost $ 

- Target Profit $ 

- Contractor Share % for both Under and Over Target 

- Ceiling $ Amount 

Cost Plus Incentive Fee 

- Target Cost $ 

- Target Fee $ 

- Contractor Share (cents/dollar) for both Under and 
Over Target 

- Max Fee (% of target cost) 

- Min Fee (% of target cost) 





Central Theme 


Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte 
said M Un bon croquis vaut mieux 
qu'un long discours" 

"A good sketch is better than a 
long speech" 

□ □□□□□ 

One Picture is Worth 10,000 
Words 



Quick Refresher 


How to Draw the Graph 
Graphing an FPIF 
What Is PTA? 

Name that Contract Type 
Range of Incentive Effectiveness 
Another Test 
Graphing Matters 




How to Draw the Graph 


Plot Targ Cost and Profit/Fee 
Plot An Underrun Point 

Calculate PTA COST ((Big # - Next 
Big #)/ Gov't Share) - Next Big# 

Plot PTA point (Calc PTA cost, 
Derived PTA Profit) 

Connect the Dots 
Plot Ceiling 

Connect the Remaining Dots 



Graphing an FPIF 



Target Cost = 
Target Profit = 
Share Ratio = 
80/20 

Ceiling = 130 


100 
= 10 


Cost $ 


COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE 
GRAPHICS/GEOMETRY 





I I I I I I 


COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE (CPIF) 



instructions for using this Model: 

-ONLY change the cells that have BLACK colored font. DO NOT change the formulas in the cells that 
have WHrTE colored font 

-If you want to change the numbers/fonriat of the axis in the graph, either RIGNT click on the axis and 
select "Format Axis" or click on the chart itself and use the Chart wizard by clicking on the icon for 
"Format Axis." 

-Make sure to SAVE the changes vou have made. 





FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE FIRM 
GRAPHICS/GEOMETRY 



What Is PTA? 


Point (Actually a Cost) of Total 

Assumption 

Maximum Price Paid by 

Government 

Elbow of Graph 

Intersection of Share line past Targ 
Cost with the 0/100 line prior to 
Ceiling 

((CP - TP)/GS) + TC = PTA Cost 
Where cost risk entirely on 
Contractor 

Where contract becomes FFP 


24 


PTA Formulas 


PTAc = ((CP - TP)/GS) + TC 
CP = PTAc + PTAp 
GS + CS = 100 
GS = ( C P-TP)/( PTAc-TC ) 

PTAp = (PTAc-TC)(l-CS)+TP-PTAc 
PTAp = TP-CS(PTAc-TC) 

PTAp = CP - PTAc 

CS = (TP - PTAp)/PTAc-TC 

And on and on and on and on 


Profit/Fee Profit/Fee 


NAME THAT CONTRACT TYPE 



Cost $ 



Cost $ 



NAME THAT CONTRACT TYPE (Cont.l 


12 

10 

0 ) 8 

U. 

I 6 

£ 4 

CL O 

2 

0 ] T T 1 

78.6 100 121.4 142.8 

Cost $ 



Cost $ 



Range of Incentive 
Effectiveness 


Computed from Target Cost, Optimistic 
Cost (Low Cost Estimate - LCE), and 
Pessimistic Cost (High Cost Estimate - 
HCE) 

Area of Cost 

- Incentive Meaningful 

- FPIF : from PTA to Target Cost then to Approx 
Equal Distance Underrun 

- CPIF : from Max Fee elbow to Min Fee elbow 
Critical Component for O/P/TC 
Methodology 


Another Test 


DESCRIBE GRAPH 

- 158 cost, 16 profit, 60/40 share, 198 ceiling 
(125%) 

- 298 cost, 30 profit, 70/30 share, 400 ceiling 
(135%) 

- 515 cost, 60 profit, 80/20 share, 671 ceiling 
(130%) 

- 400 cost, 60 profit, 75/25 share, 460 ceiling 
(115%) 

Avoid Embarassment - Know what you 
got 


Profit/Fe Profit/Fe 


Graphing Matters 




Target 

Cost 


3 Ways to Develop Contract 
Geometry 

Optimistic, Pessimistic and 
Target Cost (OPTC) Methodology 

- Example 

- Graphs 

Worm Analysis Methodology 

- Examples 

Logical Structure Methodology 



Optimistic. Pessimistic 
and Target Cost (OPTO 

Establishes .Methodolog y. 

Compute Target Cost, Target Profit/Fee, LCE, HCE 
Can Be Used To Compute Share Ratio (FPIF/CPIF), 
Min/Max fee (CPIF), Ceiling (FPIF) 

Requires: Target Cost and Profit/Fee - cost 
analysis - WGL - Fair and Reasonable 
Compute Pessimistic - considered likely "worst 
case" cost and a ppropriate profit/fee 
Compute Optimistic - considered likely "best 
case" cost and a ppropriate profit/fee 
Pessimistic gives PTA (FPIF) or min fee (CPIF) 
Optimistic gives max fee (CPIF) 



Optimistic. Pessimistic 
and Target Cost (OPTO 


Opt NegPess Methodology 


Material 95 

110125 



Material O/H 18 

20 

21 


Engineering 

24 

30 

35 

Engineering O/H 

4 

5 

6 

Manufacturing 

60 

70 

83 

Manufacturing O/H 

8 

10 

12 

Other Charges 

8 

10 

12 

G & A 

28 

40 

51 

Cost Of Money 

5 

5 

5 

Total 

250 

300 

350 



OPTC Methodology - 
Simple Example 

Target Cost = 300 (through cost analysis) 
Target Profit/Fee = 30 (through WGL) 
Optimistic Cost = 250 (through adjusted 
cost element analysis) 

Pessimistic Cost = 350 (through adjusted 
cost element analysis) - HAVE RIE 
Optimistic Fee (Max for CPIF) = 45 (through 
adjusted WGL) 

Pessimistic Profit (PTA)/Fee (Min) = 15 
(through adjusted WGL, 2-3% unallowables, 
Fac Cap Emplyd, Worm Analysis, Other?) 


Fee $ 


O/P CPIF Graph 



Profit $ 


O/P FPIF Graph 



Worm Analysis Methodology 


• Computes PTA profit which then provides ceiling price given share 
ratio, or share ratio given ceiling price 

• Profit at PTA cost (0/100 SHARE, FFP STARTS, etc.), consists of 
profit dollars without shared cost risk, should reflect a cost level 
within the control of the contractor, and thus, would be the total 
responsibility of the contractor 

• The cost control and contract type factors from WGL consist of 
those profit dollars associated with cost risk within the cost 
incentive structure and whose risk we share - other factors are 
considered the responsibility of the contractor and not unlike FFP 

Profit at PTA = WGL Profit - cost control - contract type 

Ceiling Price = PTA cost + PTA profit 

PTA cost = Target cost + (Targ profit - PTA profit) 

Contractor share 

OR 

Contractor Share = (Targ profit - PTA profit)/(PTA cost - Targ Cost) 


Worm Analysis Methodology - 
Simple Example #1 

Target Cost = 300, Target (WGL) Profit 
= 30 

Cost Control = 7 and Contract Type = 3 
Use PTAcost = Pess = 350 to Derive 
Share 

PTA Profit = 30 - 7 - 3 = 20 
Ceiling = 370 (Pess 350 + PTApr 20) 
Contractor Share = (30 - 20)/(350-300) 
= .20 



Worm Analysis Methodology - 
Simple Example #2 

Target Cost = 300, Target (WGL) Profit 
= 30 

Cost Control = 7 and Contract Type = 3 
Use Share = 80/20 to Derive PTAcost 
and Ceiling 

PTA Profit = 30 - 7 - 3 = 20 
PTA Cost = 300 + ((30 - 20)/.2) = 350 
Ceiling Price = 370 (PTAcost 350 + 
PTAprofit 20) 



Logical Structure Methodolo 


* Mixture of Worm + O/P, add dash of gut 
logic, strain out some limitations 

* Provides: Coordinated/Logical 
cost/profit/share/ceiling at different risk 
levels 

* Requires: Weighted Guidelines assessment - 
Note Contract Type Risk (FFP 2-4, FPIF/CPIF 
0-2, CPFF 0-1 ) 

* Assures: Contract Type Characteristics Exist 
- PTA 

* Considers: Continuum Risk/RIE from Cost to 
Fixed Type 



Logical Structure Methodology 

(cont) 

Examples (assumes 1% COM): 

- 85/15 share, 11% profit, 135% ceiling, PTA 81% 

- 80/20 share, 11.5% profit, 131% ceiling, PTA 79% 

- 75/25 share, 12% profit, 128% ceiling, PTA 77% 

- 70/30 share, 12.5% profit, 125% ceiling, PTA 72% 

- 65/35 share, 13% profit, 123% ceiling, PTA 68% 

- 60/40 share, 13.5% profit, 122% ceiling, PTA 65% 
Note: the more cost type - flatter share - 
lower profit - higher ceiling - larger RIE 
Note: the typical FPIF range within 2/3 to 3/4 



Pitfalls Associated with an 
Incentive Contract 


Influence the Wrong Behavior 

- Best for Gov't Not Always Obvious (Long 
vs Short Term) 

- Multiples - hurt one for another 

Must have approved accounting system 
Administration Cost 

- Price Redetermination (audit, negotiation) 

- Award Fee Tracking 
Funding Not Certain 

Requires Knowledge/Understanding 




My Lessons Learned 


"The Story": which is better deal 

-Target Price 110, Share 80/20, Ceiling 130% 

- Target Price 102, Share 80/20, Ceiling 144% 

"Knowledge is Good" 

Creativity 

- Flat Spot 

- Split Share 

- Focus on ALL Elements 
-Justify Line vs. Point 
Changes Use Same Share 



Cost Incentive Take 
Aways 

Contract Geometry is Somewhat Subjective 
Assessment - More Art than Science 
Maintain Arithmetic Logic of Contract Type 
DRAW PICTURE!!!! 

Cost Incentive Contract Allows Creativity 

Range of Incentive Effectiveness Consideration 

3 Methods Provided 

Understand Behavior being Driven 

Cost Incentive Contracts (FPIF,CPIF, FPIS) are 

LINES 

What the term PTA means 
Thomas.Mann@wpafb.af.mil